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JUDGING THE POLITICAL AND POLITICAL JUDGING:
JUSTICE SCALIA AS CASE STUDY
RICHARD L. HASEN*
INTRODUCTION
In June 2013, near the end of the Supreme Court’s 2012 term, the Court 
decided two cases of great national significance. In one case, United States 
v. Windsor,1 the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a portion of
the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which aimed at limiting the rights of
same-sex couples under federal law. It was a ruling presaging Obergefell v.
Hodges,2 the 2015 case in which the Supreme Court recognized the right of
same-sex couples to marry.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in Windsor. He protested that the Court 
had “no power under the Constitution to invalidate this democratically 
adopted legislation.”3 To Justice Scalia, the majority’s due process and equal 
protection constitutional analysis was especially wrongheaded in its failure 
to defer to the will of the American people, as expressed through its repre-
sentatives in Congress.
Scalia’s statement in Windsor was rich in irony, because it came only a 
day after he joined a Supreme Court majority in Shelby County v. Holder,4 a
case striking down a key portion of the federal Voting Rights Act. The 
stricken part of the Act singled out states with a history of racial discrimina-
tion in voting that had to get federal approval, or preclearance, before making 
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. This Address builds
upon ideas first presented in Richard L. Hasen, After Scalia: The Future of United States Election Law ,
17 A 1 (Koji Higashikawa trans., 2017) (Japan), and RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF
CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION (2018). It is a revised version of
a Keynote Address delivered at “The Supreme Court and American Politics,” a symposium held October
17, 2017 at the Chicago-Kent College of Law. Richard L. Hasen, Keynote Address at the Chicago-Kent
Law Review Symposium: The Supreme Court and American Politics (Oct. 17, 2017). Thanks to sympo-
sium participants for useful comments and suggestions.
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 05 (2015). 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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any changes to their voting rules, and to prove that their proposed changes 
would not make minority voters worse off.5
In Shelby County, the Court in a 5–4 decision struck down part of a law 
that Congress enacted in 1965 and which large bipartisan congressional ma-
jorities had repeatedly reenacted and expanded.6 What’s worse, the constitu-
tional theory relied upon by the majority—that preclearance deprived 
covered states of their “equal sovereignty”—was new and hardly inevitable.7
Why did Justice Scalia believe in deference to the democratic processes 
in one case and not the other? He gave us a clue in the Shelby County case’s 
oral argument. Justice Scalia disagreed with Solicitor General Donald Ver-
rilli’s suggestion that Congress was entitled to make a judgment that contin-
ued racial problems justified the continuation of the preclearance part of the 
Act:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, maybe it was making that judgment, Mr. Ver-
rilli. . . . The problem here, however, is . . . that the initial enactment of 
this legislation . . . in a time when the need for it was so much more abun-
dantly clear was—in the Senate, there—it was double-digits against it. 
And that was only a 5-year term. Then, it is reenacted 5 years later, again 
for a 5-year term. Double-digits against it in the Senate. Then it was reen-
acted for 7 years. Single digits against it. Then enacted for 25 years, 8 
Senate votes against it.
And this last enactment, not a single vote in the Senate against it. And the 
House is pretty much the same. Now, I don’t think that’s attributable to 
the fact that it is so much clearer now that we need this. I think it is at-
tributable, very likely attributable, to a phenomenon that is called perpet-
uation of racial entitlement. It’s been written about. Whenever a society 
adopts racial entitlements, it is very difficult to get out of them through the 
normal political processes. . . .
. . . .
Even the name of it is wonderful: The Voting Rights Act. Who is going to 
vote against that in the future?8
In 2009, when the Court first considered the constitutionality of the 
2006 Voting Rights Act renewal, Scalia also remarked at oral argument on 
the Senate’s 98–0 approval of the law. The Justice said: “[T]he Israeli Su-
preme Court, the Sanhedrin, used to have a rule that if the death penalty was 
pronounced unanimously, it was invalid, because there must be something 
5. Id. at 2631.
6. Id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7. See Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1209–11 (2016).
8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–48, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96), 2013 WL 
6908203, at *46–48.
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wrong there.”9 He asked counsel defending the law whether he really thought 
any incumbent would vote against extending the Act.10
The Sanhedrin remark caught the attention of New York Times reporter
Adam Liptak, who dryly noted that: “Justice Scalia was not announcing a 
universal principle. Indeed, he almost certainly does not think that every 
unanimous legislative act is problematic. In 1986, for instance, the Senate 
approved Justice Scalia’s nomination to the Supreme Court by a vote of 98 
to 0.”11
It was not just race where Justice Scalia saw what he considered to be 
“special interests” messing with the “normal political processes” and thereby 
obviating the need for judicial deference. Justice Scalia made this point on 
the question of gay rights as well.
In the 1996 case Romer v. Evans,12 the Court struck down a voter-initi-
ated state constitutional amendment in Colorado repealing laws barring dis-
crimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. The Court held that the 
amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
by denying these groups certain legal protection without rational basis.13
Justice Scalia issued a vehement dissent, rejecting the majority’s con-
clusion that the law was motivated by anti-gay animus. The Justice again 
pointed to supposed defects in the political process. He wrote, relying upon 
certain stereotypes about gays and lesbians, that:
The problem (a problem, that is, for those who wish to retain social disap-
probation of homosexuality) is that, because those who engage in homo-
sexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain 
communities, have high disposable income, and, of course, care about ho-
mosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, they 
possess political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and 
statewide. Quite understandably, they devote this political power to 
achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social ac-
ceptance, of homosexuality.14
Justice Scalia’s shifting deference to democratic procedures and the po-
litical process might be no more than rhetorical flourishes, offered in opin-
ions applying neutral principles to determine the scope of the Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause. Notes about democratic dysfunction might provide 
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 
193 (2009) (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 1146055, at *51.
10. Id.
11. Adam Liptak, Sidebar: On and Off the Bench, the Eminently Quotable Justice Scalia,
N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/us/12bar.html [perma.cc/67ZJ-WE5B].
12. 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
13. Id. at 626–27.
14. Id. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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nothing more than what Justice Elena Kagan once referred to in a different 
context as “extra icing on a cake already frosted.”15
Or the shifting deference might provide a window into the Justice’s de-
cisionmaking, explaining part of the reason for the Justice’s hostility to race-
based affirmative action, voting rights cases, and gay rights legislation. Per-
haps he viewed these laws as the product of a dysfunctional political process, 
although he never explained why some organizing for political action was 
more objectionable than others.
In this Address, I consider through the lens of Justice Scalia’s opinions
the role that views of the political process play, at least rhetorically, in how 
Supreme Court Justices decide cases. I focus on Justice Scalia’s contradic-
tory views on self-dealing and incumbency protection across a range of 
cases, comparing campaign finance, on the one hand, to partisan gerryman-
dering, voter identification laws, political patronage, and ballot access rules 
on the other. In this context, I argue that the defects in the political process 
he sometimes flagged appeared to do little work, and that his decisions are 
better understood by his ideological commitments to what Chicago-Kent 
Professor Steven Heyman calls “conservative libertarianism.”16 Scalia’s 
views on self-dealing appeared to reflect rather than drive his legal analysis.
The discussion draws and expands upon ideas in my 2018 book, The
Justice of Contradictions: Antonin Scalia and the Politics of Disruption.17 I
use Justice Scalia as an example in this Address not because he was neces-
sarily more contradictory in his judging of the political realm than any of the 
other Justices, but because I have been focusing on his writings for the last 
few years as I worked on the book.
Part II describes Justice Scalia’s contradictory approaches on questions 
of self-dealing and incumbency. Part III argues that, the contradictions lined 
up with the Justice’s ideological and partisan commitments, and that this is 
hardly unique to Justice Scalia. Finally, Part IV offers three lessons to be 
learned from this case study for the interaction of the Court, the political 
branches, and election law.
15. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1093 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
16. See generally Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Ju-
risprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231 (2014).
17. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE POLITICS 
OF DISRUPTION (2018).
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II. JUSTICE SCALIA AND SELF-DEALING: THE CONTRADICTIONS
A. Campaign Finance
I begin with a description of Justice Scalia’s contradictory approach to 
politicians’ self-dealing, starting with campaign finance.
Although many people are familiar with the Supreme Court’s contro-
versial 2010 opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,18
holding that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend unlimited 
sums in candidate elections, the case’s roots go back to dissents by Justice 
Scalia and Justice Kennedy in a 1990 case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce.19 The Court in Austin upheld a Michigan state campaign finance 
law barring business corporations from spending money from their general 
treasury funds on election ads.20 The corporation instead could raise money 
and control a separate “political action committee,” or “PAC.”21 Michigan’s 
law exempted media corporations, like corporate-owned newspapers or tel-
evision stations, providing news and commentary22 It also did not apply to 
limit spending by labor unions, as the parallel federal law did.23
With Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Scalia dissenting, the Supreme 
Court upheld Michigan’s PAC requirement for corporate spending in elec-
tions.24 In a 1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo,25 the Court held that campaign lim-
its could only be upheld under the First Amendment if they were aimed at 
preventing the appearance or actuality of “corruption,” which the Court had 
defined as roughly akin to bribery and undue influence.26 Despite this, the 
Austin Court held that Michigan’s corporate spending limit law was justified 
to prevent what it termed a “different type of corruption in the political arena: 
the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that 
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”27
Justice Scalia tartly rejected the “antidistortion” argument. He began 
his dissenting opinion by flagging what he saw as censorship allowed by 
18. 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
19. See 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
20. Id. at 654–55.
21. Id. at 669 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 666–67 (majority opinion).
23. Id. at 665 n.4.
24. Id. at 668–69.
25. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
26. Id. at 26–29.
27. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659–60.
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Michigan’s law, calling it “Orwellian,” and a big focus of his dissent in Aus-
tin was what he viewed as the self-interest of politicians in passing these 
laws.28
Scalia wrote that an “incumbent politician who says he welcomes full 
and fair debate is no more to be believed than the entrenched monopolist 
who says he welcomes full and fair competition.”29 He further suggested that 
the reason Michigan regulated the spending of business corporations and not 
labor unions was because labor unions in Michigan, the state that produced 
many American automobiles, had considerable political power.30 Union po-
litical power, too, was somewhat less legitimate in his eyes.
Justice Scalia made similar points in other campaign finance cases, em-
phasizing self-dealing as a reason to strike down these laws. Indeed, the role 
of incumbency protection took center stage in his partial dissent in the 2003 
case, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.31 The case considered the 
constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, more com-
monly known as the McCain–Feingold law. The law reined in so-called “soft 
money” and “issue advocacy” which had rendered earlier federal campaign 
finance law mostly ineffective.32 The Supreme Court in McConnell reaf-
firmed Austin,33 seven years before the Court in Citizens United overruled 
Austin as well as this part of McConnell.34
Justice Scalia opened his partial dissent in McConnell by calling it a 
“sad day for the freedom of speech”35 and raising the incumbency issue:
We are governed by Congress, and this legislation prohibits the criticism 
of Members of Congress by those entities most capable of giving such 
criticism loud voice: national political parties and corporations, both of 
the commercial and the not-for-profit sort. It forbids pre-election criticism 
of incumbents by corporations, even not-for-profit corporations, by use of 
their general funds; and forbids national-party use of “soft” money to fund 
“issue ads” that incumbents find so offensive.36
Justice Scalia’s professed concern about incumbency and self-dealing 
led him to be very skeptical of campaign finance limits challenged under the 
First Amendment, and he almost never voted to sustain a challenged limit. 
28. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 692.
30. Id.
31. See 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
32. See id. at 122–29 (discussing rise of soft money and issue advocacy).
33. Id. at 211.
34. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010). 
35. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part).
36. Id.
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His writings suggested that the dangers of incumbency and self-dealing pro-
vided a reason for extra judicial scrutiny of laws regulating the political pro-
cess.
And yet, his concern about incumbency protection and self-dealing did 
not extend beyond the campaign finance cases. Indeed, in four other areas, 
Justice Scalia either minimized the dangers of self-dealing, professed an in-
ability of the courts to handle the problem, or even celebrated the side effects 
of political self-interest.
B. Partisan Gerrymandering
Consider partisan gerrymandering, which is very much in the news as 
the Court returns to the issue this term in Gill v. Whitford,37 the partisan ger-
rymandering case out of Wisconsin. It is sometimes said that gerrymandering 
allows legislators to choose their voters rather than the other way around. 
When legislators draw district lines to help themselves or their political par-
ties, they sometimes engage in some of the rawest political self-dealing im-
aginable, and the question in Whitford is whether the Court will put the 
brakes on some of the most egregious activity.
For a long time, the Supreme Court refused to get involved in most dis-
tricting and apportionment disputes, finding them to be “nonjusticiable” po-
litical questions without judicially manageable standards. Beginning in 
Baker v. Carr38 in 1962, the Court allowed some challenges to districting. 
After cases such as Reynolds v. Sims,39 recognizing the one person, one vote 
rule, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, which protected minority vot-
ing rights in districting and other cases.40 Since the 1990s, the Court has held 
that taking race too much into account violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the United States Constitution, putting states in the position of navigating 
between the race-conscious requirements of the Voting Rights Act and the 
Court-created rule not to make race a predominant factor in redistricting.41
Even with all of these rules in place, politicians have still been able to 
draw districts that give partisan advantage to one side or another. For exam-
ple, in ongoing litigation over congressional districts in North Carolina, the 
37. 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (mem.) (postponing jurisdiction and setting the case for argument).
38. 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
39. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
40. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315–30 (1966) (describing circumstances of 
the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and rejecting constitutional challenge to its preclearance 
provisions).
41. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993). On the evolution of this claim, see Richard L. 
Hasen, Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival, 57 ALA. L. REV. 365 (2015).
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Republican majority legislature recently passed a redistricting plan that cre-
ates ten safe Republican districts and three safe Democratic districts, even 
though the Republican–Democratic split in the state is about even. North 
Carolina Representative David Lewis, when asked why he drew ten of thir-
teen districts for Republicans in a fifty–fifty state, astonishingly replied: “be-
cause I do not believe it’s possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 
two Democrats.”42
The fight to get the Court to rein in such partisan gerrymandering so far 
has been unsuccessful. In a 1986 case, Davis v. Bandemer,43 the Supreme 
Court agreed that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable. However, 
the Bandemer standard proved uncertain in theory and impossible in fact: for 
eighteen years after Bandemer there were no successful partisan gerryman-
dering cases.44
The Supreme Court returned to the issue in the 2004 case, Vieth v. Ju-
belirer,45 involving allegations of partisan gerrymandering in the creation of 
congressional districts for the state of Pennsylvania. The Court divided into 
three groups. Justice Scalia, for four conservative Justices, took the position 
that Bandemer was wrong on the question of justiciability because there were 
no “judicially manageable” standards for courts to apply. He believed courts 
were without the power to hear such claims.46 The four liberal Justices be-
lieved Bandemer was right that these kinds of cases are justiciable but wrong 
on the standard—and the dissenters set forth a variety of proposed standards 
to police gerrymandering.47
Justice Kennedy, writing for himself alone, stood in the middle. He 
agreed with the liberals that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable, 
but agreed with Justice Scalia and the other conservative Justices that each 
of the proposed gerrymandering standards did not separate permissible from 
impermissible consideration of partisanship in drawing district lines.48 The
result was that plaintiffs in Vieth lost their case but the door remained open 
for future challenges. We will see in Whitford if Justice Kennedy has 
changed his mind about the old standards or found a new standard, such as 
42. Jim Morrill, Common Cause Challenges Partisan Gerrymandering in NC, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Aug. 5, 2016, 10:18 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-govern-
ment/election/article93903767.html [https://perma.cc/HZX5-WGHH].
43. 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).
44. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278–79 (2004) (plurality opinion) (describing the lack of 
successful partisan gerrymandering claims under the Bandemer standard).
45. Id. at 271–72.
46. Id. at 305–06.
47. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 353 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id.
at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 306–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the “efficiency gap” standard put forward by Professor Nick Stephanopoulos 
and researcher Eric McGhee.49
In perhaps the most interesting aspect of Justice Scalia’s Vieth opinion 
was his admission that extreme partisan gerrymandering may well be uncon-
stitutional even if the courts do not have the tools to police it:
Much of [Justice Stevens’s] dissent is addressed to the incompatibility of 
severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles. We do not disa-
gree with that judgment, any more than we disagree with the judgment 
that it would be unconstitutional for the Senate to employ, in impeachment 
proceedings, procedures that are incompatible with its obligation to “try” 
impeachments. The issue we have discussed is not whether severe partisan 
gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to 
say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy. . . .
. . . Justice Stevens says we “er[r] in assuming that politics is ‘an ordinary 
and lawful motive’” in districting—but all he brings forward to contest 
that is the argument that an excessive injection of politics is unlawful. So 
it is, and so does our opinion assume.50
The discussion was an odd statement of judicial powerlessness, and it 
was in some tension with Justice Scalia’s acceptance within Vieth itself of 
the legitimacy of some partisan self-dealing. As Professor Michael Kang re-
cently explained,51 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Vieth has been most responsi-
ble for setting out the idea that taking partisanship into account in drawing 
district lines is “an ordinary and lawful motive”52 in districting and that “par-
tisan districting is a lawful and common practice.”53 Scalia shifted the dis-
cussion to the question of how much of the legal activity crosses the line into 
unconstitutional activity, and in so doing, gave wide berth for legislators to 
engage in self-dealing when drawing district lines.
C. The Voting Wars
Justice Scalia was similarly unbothered by the use of raw political 
power in setting the rules for voting, fights that elsewhere I’ve termed “the 
voting wars.”54 In the period since the disputed 2000 election, Republican 
legislatures have passed laws generally making it harder to register and to 
49. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Effi-
ciency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2015).
50. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292–93 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
51. Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Parti-
sanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 363 (2017).
52. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286.
53. Id.
54. See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT 
ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012).
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vote, and Democratic legislatures have done the opposite, with both parties 
believing that such laws would give them at least a small partisan ad-
vantage.55
One of the first voting wars cases to make it to the Supreme Court was 
the 2008 decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.56 The issue 
in Crawford concerned the constitutionality of an Indiana law that required 
voters to produce an acceptable form of photographic identification in order 
to vote.57 The state of Indiana justified its law as necessary to prevent voter 
fraud, but the state conceded there were no cases of impersonation fraud rec-
orded in the state, the only kind of fraud that an identification law would 
prevent.58 Plaintiffs’ counsel had their own problems in the case, having
trouble coming up with plaintiffs who did not have the right identification 
and had trouble getting one to satisfy the new law.59
As in Vieth, the Court again divided into three camps. Justice Stevens, 
writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy, upheld the 
law against a facial challenge.60 According to Stevens, an identification re-
quirement imposed only a minor burden for most voters, and the law was 
justified on anti-fraud and public confidence grounds.61 Stevens reached this 
opinion despite the lack of evidence the law helped on either account. He 
had to go back to Boss Tweed’s day to find examples of the relevant kind of 
voter fraud.62 Stevens left open the possibility of as-applied lawsuits brought 
by groups of voters who faced significant burdens in getting the free ID.63
Justice Scalia, writing for himself, Justice Alito, and Justice Thomas, 
was harsher than Stevens. He agreed the law imposed little burden on most 
voters and voted to uphold the law. But he believed the law could be applied 
against everyone, precluding the possibility of as-applied challenges from 
voters facing special burdens obtaining the right form of identification. He 
wrote that, “[t]he Indiana photo-identification law is a generally applicable, 
nondiscriminatory voting regulation, and our precedents refute the view that 
individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity of the burden it 
55. See generally id. (describing these voting wars).
56. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
57. Id. at 185 (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 194.
59. See id. at 201.
60. Id. at 203–04.
61. Id. at 195–96.
62. See id. at 195 nn.11–12.
63. See id. at 204 (rejecting only facial challenge to the law).
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imposes.”64 For Justice Scalia, voters such as those who were born in con-
centration camps and therefore lacked a birth certificate or who were too 
poor to afford the $20 fee to buy a birth certificate needed to prove identity 
to get a so-called “free” identification card would simply be out of luck.
The Indiana voter identification law passed on a party-line vote, sup-
ported by Republican legislators and opposed by Democratic legislators.65
Justice Stevens acknowledged that fact, but said that because the state also 
had non-partisan reasons for passing the law, partisanship was no reason to 
strike it down.66 Justice Scalia’s opinion did not even address partisanship 
concerns. The Court allowed Indiana to enforce its law despite the legisla-
tors’ likely partisan motivations and without proof that the law stopped any 
real fraud or promoted voter confidence.
D. Political Patronage and Ballot Access
This part concludes with two more quick examples illustrating that Jus-
tice Scalia sometimes not only tolerated political self-dealing; he had actu-
ally praised it. In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,67 the Court held 
patronage hiring, firing, transferring, and promoting of non-policymaking 
employees violates the First Amendment. After this 1990 case, the state of 
Illinois could no longer fire an administrative assistant or security guard for 
not belonging to the governor’s political party or paying party dues. The 
Court held that premising non-policymaking government jobs on political 
loyalty punished voters for their views protected by the First Amendment.
Justice Scalia dissented and thought it was a good idea to give a gover-
nor the power to hire, fire, promote, and demote employees based solely on 
partisan affiliation. He believed that patronage-based employment promoted 
strong political parties by generating loyalty and party funds. Scalia found 
this party interest to be important enough to override employees’ First 
Amendment rights to be protected from punishment for failing to join—or 
belonging to another—political party. He wrote in dissent:
It may well be that the Good Government Leagues of America were right, 
and that Plunkitt, James Michael Curley, and their ilk were wrong; but that 
is not entirely certain. As the merit principle has been extended and its 
effects increasingly felt; as the Boss Tweeds, the Tammany Halls, the Pen-
dergast Machines, the Byrd Machines, and the Daley Machines have faded 
64. Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. at 203 n.21 (plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 203–04.
67. 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990).
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into history; we find that political leaders at all levels increasingly com-
plain of the helplessness of elected government, unprotected by “party dis-
cipline,” before the demands of small and cohesive interest groups.68
And then there was New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez 
Torres.69 That 2008 case concerned a constitutional challenge to the means 
by which certain New York trial court judges were nominated by parties and 
placed on the general election ballot. The record showed that party insiders 
controlled the nomination process, and demanded some political patronage 
in exchange for political support. Party nominees were virtually guaranteed 
election—Democrats in some parts of New York and Republicans in oth-
ers.70 It was possible to qualify for the ballot without being a party nominee 
by collecting petition signatures, but those candidates inevitably lost.71
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the challenge to New York’s 
party nomination process for judges, but the Justices offered different rea-
sons for reaching this result. Justice Scalia wrote a broad majority opinion, 
which went much further than necessary to decide the case. He wrote that 
the Constitution contained no guarantee of a “fair shot” to win an election.72
Going even further, he noted that, “[p]arty conventions, with their attendant 
‘smoke-filled rooms’ and domination by party leaders, have long been an 
accepted manner of selecting party candidates.”73 It is hard to think of more 
self-dealing than the smoke-filled room, but Justice Scalia in Lopez Torres
seems to look back on it nostalgically.
Say what you will about Justice Scalia’s decisions in the partisan ger-
rymandering, voting wars, political patronage, and ballot access decisions. 
But it is hard to say they express great concern about the dangers of incum-
bency and self-dealing, much less that they suggest reasons for striking down 
a democratically-enacted law.
III. EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENCE
What explains Justice Scalia’s near obsession with incumbency protec-
tion in the campaign finance cases and his acceptance, or even embrace, of 
self-dealing in other cases? It is not simply that the campaign finance cases 
involve the First Amendment—that’s true too of the patronage cases and 
68. Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
70. Id. at 201, 205.
71. Id. at 202 (“In [the Second Circuit’s] view, because ‘one-party rule’ prevailed 
within New York’s judicial districts, a candidate had a constitutional right to gain access to the party’s
convention, notwithstanding her ability to get on the general-election ballot by petition signatures.”).
72. Id. at 205–06.
73. Id. at 206.
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some of the other cases as well. Why does limiting six-figure donations by 
wealthy individuals, corporations, and labor unions smack of self-dealing 
while it is unobjectionable to fire the state janitor who refuses to sign up with 
the governor’s political party and pay party dues?
It appears that Justice Scalia’s decisions in these cases, like his deci-
sions in cases across many areas of constitutional and statutory law, reflect 
his conservative-libertarian impulses. In the First Amendment context, Pro-
fessor Heyman describes a conservative-libertarian jurisprudential approach 
which advocates invalidating “laws or policies that in their view threatened 
to subordinate individual liberty to liberal or progressive goals such as polit-
ical reform, racial and sexual equality, gay rights, secularism, unionization, 
and anti-smoking efforts.”74 Justice Scalia was firmly in this camp.
More generally, Justice Scalia generally opposed extensive regulation 
of politics by the courts and expressed dissatisfaction with such interference, 
except when it came to limiting the role of money in politics or protecting 
voting rights. Sometimes partisanship was worth screaming about; at other 
times it was lawful, inevitable, and even a vital tool of democracy. It was his 
fundamental conservatism, which seemed to drive both this jurisprudence 
and his views of when the political process was failing to reach fair results.75
IV. THREE LESSONS
Before turning to three lessons from this examination of Justice Scalia’s 
views of self-dealing, it is worth emphasizing that Justice Scalia is not unique 
in letting his ideological views color his jurisprudence. Consider Justice 
Breyer, for example, who was on the opposite side from Justice Scalia in 
most of the cases I have discussed. Justice Breyer was much more attuned to 
partisan self-dealing in the context of gerrymandering76 and voting wars77
than in the campaign finance context. Indeed, when it came to campaign fi-
nance, Justice Breyer was perhaps the greatest proponent on the Court that 
campaign finance laws deserve deference because of the special “expertise” 
of elected officials in the means of campaigns (though he did acknowledge 
a need to be wary of dangers of incumbency protection).78 Justice Breyer 
74. Heyman, supra note 16, at 298.
75. See HASEN, supra note 17, ch. 6 (describing Justice Scalia’s views in cases involving democ-
racy and governance).
76. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 355–56 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 237–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where a 
legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for example, in the field of election regula-
tion, the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments—at least where that deference does 
not risk such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from effective 
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afforded no deference to the expertise of officials when they passed redis-
tricting plans or passed voter identification laws.
What lessons can we learn from this look at Justice Scalia’s views of 
incumbency and self-dealing?
Lesson # 1: When All Else Fails, Lower Your Expectations. Back in 
2000, my mentor Dan Lowenstein wrote a book chapter entitled, The Su-
preme Court Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Fa-
vors.79 Lowenstein’s main point was that overaggressive judicial review in 
election law cases would simply empower the courts, which had no over-
arching theory of appropriate political competition, to say how the political 
process should be regulated. That point is certainly true, but I would go fur-
ther: the problem is not just that there is a lack of coherence on issues like 
self-dealing on a multimember court with shifting constituencies. It is that 
the Justices themselves are not internally consistent, and they are driven at 
least in part by their ideology. These ideologies, however, increasingly line 
up with partisanship.
This means that consistency and adherence to precedent will have only 
limited value in predicting how the Supreme Court will choose or not choose 
to regulate politics. For a decade, American election law turned on what Jus-
tice O’Connor had for breakfast. First, the Justice supported corporate spend-
ing limits in campaigns, then she opposed them, then supported them again 
against First Amendment challenge.80 Since Justice O’Connor’s retirement 
it has been Justice Kennedy in the middle, and then if he retires, Chief Justice 
Roberts. We might as well have the parties argue Gill v. Whitford just to 
Justice Kennedy, and give the rest of the Justices a day off.
Political scientist Anthony Downs’s admonition to focus on the median 
voter81 has the greatest currency on the Supreme Court, and these Justices 
are swing Justices precisely because their ideology is cross-cutting or tem-
pered by pragmatism. That was less true with Justices like Justice Scalia, or 
Justice Breyer.
electoral challenge.”); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (plurality opinion) (examin-
ing whether Vermont’s low contribution limits “magnify the advantages of incumbency to the point where 
they put challengers to a significant disadvantage”).
79. Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for 
Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245–66 (David K. Ryden 
ed., 2000).
80. Justice O’Connor concurred in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for 
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), which embraced the antidistortion rationale that later became a holding 
in the Austin case. She dissented in Austin but concurred in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
reaffirming Austin.
81. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 7 (1957).
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Lesson # 2. The Supreme Court Is a Political Court. As we saw, when 
it came to self-dealing and regulation of the political process, Justice Scalia 
decided cases in line with his ideology, an ideology which, as I argue more 
broadly in The Justice of Contradictions, lines up with a neo-Trumpian pop-
ulist, nationalist, conservative, libertarian ideology. Sometimes, and for 
some Justices, pragmatism trumps ideology.
That Justices are ideological is nothing new, and this too is not confined 
to conservative Justices. Just think of Justice William Brennan, who was 
pretty strongly liberal, tempering his liberalism to get to five votes when 
necessary. What is new and different is the lining up of ideology and party 
affiliation. Since the retirement of Justice Stevens, all the Supreme Court 
Justices generally considered liberal were nominated by Democratic presi-
dents and all the Justices considered conservative were nominated by Re-
publican presidents.
I do not mean to suggest that the Justices are, to use Professor Justin 
Levitt’s useful term, “tribal partisans.”82 Such partisans “may favor public 
action purely because the policy in question is perceived to benefit those with 
a shared partisan affiliation, or because the policy in question is perceived to 
injure partisan opponents, wholly divorced from—or stronger yet, contrary 
to—the policymaker’s conception of the policy’s other merits.”83
Few close observers of the Court view the Justices as tribal partisans. 
They generally are not voting in a particular way to help out their own party 
(although the votes and reasoning of the controversial 2000 case Bush v. 
Gore,84 ending the presidential recount in Florida, pushes against these no-
tions). Rather, it is that these Justices were chosen for nomination because 
their jurisprudential views line up with the interests and ideology of each 
party.
Consider the early signals from the newest Justice, Neil Gorsuch, and 
where he is likely to end up on these disputed issues. He looks to be deeply 
conservative on many issues, such as the question of gay rights, with perhaps 
an independent streak on criminal procedure matters, much like Justice 
Scalia.85 I have every belief Justice Gorsuch is not voting in a generally con-
servative way because he is a Republican or because he wants to help the 
82. Justin Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1787, 1798 (2014).
83. Id.
84. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); HASEN, supra note 54, at 11–40 (describing events leading up to Bush v. 
Gore, and analyzing case).
85. Richard L. Hasen, Gorsuch is the New Scalia, Just as Trump Promised, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 27, 
2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-hasen-gorsuch-scalia-20170627-
story.html [https://perma.cc/W5LU-G75B].
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Republican party. Rather, he was chosen for this position by a Republican 
President and Senate because of how he votes.
This confluence of ideology and party has two important implications 
for the Supreme Court and American politics. First, if all the Democratic-
appointed Justices on the Court vote the same way in campaign finance, vot-
ing rights and gerrymandering cases and all the Republican-appointed Jus-
tices vote the other way, election law cases will become even more 
politicized than they have been. No more Justice Stevenses, Souters, or 
Whites crossing party lines. Litigants too are then more likely to frame their 
disputes in partisan and ideological terms.
Second, and just as importantly, the public and other political branches 
will begin to see the Court as a more partisan institution, and less sophisti-
cated individuals will believe, and cynical politicians across the aisle will 
push the argument, that these Justices are in fact engaged in tribal partisan-
ship.
Lesson # 3: The Political Branches Will Respond Politically to a Polit-
ical Court. In era of hyperpartisanship, and with the realignment I have de-
scribed on the Supreme Court, the politics of the Court will influence how 
the President and Senate view the Court’s work and in turn that view will 
influence the Court’s future composition.
This new sharp division—not just ideological but between parties—
goes beyond election law to issues such as abortion rights, gun rights, race, 
and congressional power, and it explains why we have seen the erosion of 
norms over judicial nomination, filibusters and super majority rules, includ-
ing the blockade of Merrick Garland,86 Senate majority leader Harry Reid’s 
blowing up of the filibuster for judicial nominations aside from the Supreme 
Court,87 Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell’s blowing up of the fili-
buster for Supreme Court nominations and the party line confirmation of 
Justice Gorsuch,88 and soon the demise of the “blue slip” for federal appeals 
court nominations.89 The stakes are starker and the lines are more clearly 
86. HASEN, supra note 17, at 169–70 (describing Garland nomination’s failure).
87. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminates Most Filibusters on Nomi-
nees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limit-fil-
ibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-
9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html [https://perma.cc/V7NT-LL9M].
88. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-
court-senate.html [https://perma.cc/XGC8-F65E].
89. Carl Hulse, Trump and McConnell See Way to Make Conservatives Happy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/politics/trump-mcconnell-judicial-nominees.html 
[perma.cc/8JUU-YVQD] (“Mr. McConnell has also made clear his interest in eliminating the so-
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drawn, making compromise on judicial nominations less likely. When Dem-
ocrats come back into power, it is possible that we will see new attempts to 
pack the Court to restore a partisan advantage.
In sum, we in the United States now face a difficult confluence of two 
factors. First, the Supreme Court of the United States has great power over 
the rules and structure of American elections, from money in politics, to leg-
islative districts, to voting rights and the basic question of who gets to exer-
cise the franchise and how they may do so. Second, the Justices on the Court 
have different views on constitutional questions about these election rules, 
views which increasingly line up not only with the ideology of the Justices 
but also with their apparent partisan affiliations.
Before long, if not already, voters likely will think of the Justices in 
more partisan terms, and of the Supreme Court as a Democratic Party or 
Republican Party-dominated institution. This will be especially true if the 
Justices are inconsistent in applying concepts across cases, as Justice Scalia 
was (and other Justices are) when it came to the dangers of incumbency pro-
tection and partisanship. Incumbency protection was enough to doom cam-
paign finance laws but not partisan gerrymandering or biased election 
administration.
The convergence of a Court with great power over election rules and an 
increasing partisan divide between the liberal and conservative over how to 
resolve election cases means that there will be stress on both the United 
States electoral system and the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, as election 
rules shift along with Supreme Court majorities, and as it becomes harder for 
the public to avoid seeing Justices as making political, rather than legal, de-
cisions. It is a dangerous combination for American democracy.
called blue slip, one last arcane procedural tool that Democrats have used to slow nominees in the Judi-
ciary Committee. If he is successful in ending that Senate tradition, which gives a senator the right to 
block a judicial nominee in his or her state, it could greatly accelerate the entire process.”).
